Recently, I had a case that is becoming typical in our modern age, when the right to travel (and change residence) is protected by the Constitution of the United States, and South Carolina has eliminated the presumption against relocation. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (recognizing “at least three different components” to the right to travel granted by the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Latimer v. Farmer, 360 S.C. 375, 602 S.E.2d 32 (2004) (eliminating the former presumption against relocation and outlining four factors to use for relocation cases). Here is a hypothetical scenario to give you an idea: Parents with a child divorce in one state and the court orders joint custody. Both parents move individually from that state to two different states, one being South Carolina. Joint custody (as ordered) is no longer a viable option, but the parents orally agree to different arrangements. Inevitably, there is a dispute over the arrangements, and so begins the race to the parent’s respective courthouses. Much may be influenced by who wins this race and who has majority custody.
Both state and federal law are invoked because multiple states may be involved in this dispute. For example, in our relatively simplistic hypothetical, at least three states are involved in the custody dispute: 1) the original state, which already has an order in place affecting custody; 2) Parent 1’s state; and (3) Parent 2’s state. South Carolina, like many other states, has adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to “govern subject matter jurisdiction in interstate child custody disputes.” H v. G, Op. No. 4955 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Mar. 16, 2012) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 11 at 27). Federally, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) was also enacted for this purpose. Id. Subject matter jurisdiction generally refers to a court’s authority to hear a case and make a determination. Both these laws attempt to determine which state’s family court has jurisdiction to make or modify a custody determination, but where they conflict, the PKPA governs. Clay v. Burckle, 369 S.C. 651, 656, 633 S.E.2d 173, 176 (Ct. App. 2006).
The PKPA directs states to enforce, rather than modify, “any custody determination or visitation determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another [s]tate.”[1] 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (2006). Determinations are consistent with the PKPA “only if [the] court has jurisdiction under” its own state laws and an additional “condition[] is met.” Id. § 1738A(c)(1),(2) (emphasis added). “[A] state law inquiry” is incorporated into the PKPA “necessarily result[ing] in the application of the issuing state’s version of the . . . UCCJEA.” H v. G, Op. No. 4955 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Mar. 16, 2012) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 11 at 27). The following constitute additional conditions: (1) the state qualifies as a “home [s]tate of the child”;[2] (2) “it appears that no other [s]tate would” qualify as a home state and assumption of jurisdiction “is in the best interest of the child”;[3] (3) “an emergency”[4] necessitates protection of the child or “the child has been abandoned” and “the child is physically present in [the] [s]tate”; (4) “it appears that no other [s]tate would have jurisdiction under” any other additional condition “or another [s]tate has declined to exercise jurisdiction”[5] and assumption of jurisdiction “is in the best interest of the child”; or (5) “continuing jurisdiction” exists. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)-(E) (2006) (emphasis added). Child custody determinations made by a South Carolina court having jurisdiction under the UCCJEA are binding on “all persons who have been served” according to South Carolina law “or notified” according to the UCCJEA, “or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard.” S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-310 (2010). “As to those persons, the determination is conclusive as to all decided issues of law and fact except to the extent the determination is modified.” Id. However, before any “determination is made, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants, any parent whose parental rights have not previously terminated and any person who has physical custody of a child.”[6] 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(e) (2006).
A state court that makes a determination consistent with the PKPA has continuing jurisdiction “as long as” that state “remains the residence of the child or . . . any contestant” and state law continues to grant jurisdiction. Id. § 1738A(d). In our hypothetical, the original state had continuing jurisdiction until both parents moved out of that state with the child. Additionally, any new state the parents move to would attempt to enforce the original state’s order, or custody determination, before considering modification of the determination. In practice, this is done by registering the out-of-state custody order in the parents’ new state(s) for enforcement. For a moment, assume that both parents, instead of moving to separate states, individually moved to the same state (as many divorced couples do for the sake of their children). The registration process for the parents’ original custody order would be rather simple—the parents would register the order with a court in the new state—involving multiple counties, but only one state. Contrast this with our original hypothetical: Both new states can register the determination for enforcement. However, with joint custody being unworkable in this scenario, enforcement alone is not enough. In our hypothetical, the parents would want the original state’s custody order modified.
Under the PKPA, state courts cannot modify another state’s custody or visitation determination unless “it has jurisdiction to make” the determination, and “the other [s]tate” with continuing jurisdiction “no longer has jurisdiction” or declined jurisdiction. Id. § 1738A(f)(1),(2) (custody determination); see also § 1738A(h) (visitation determination). Under the UCCJEA, South Carolina can modify an out-of-state determination when it “has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination and” either: (1) the original state “determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction” or that South Carolina “would be a more convenient forum”; or (2) the original state or, more likely, the South Carolina court “determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any other person acting as a parent” no longer “reside” in the original state. H v. G, Op. No. 4955 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Mar. 16, 2012) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 11 at 27). A South Carolina court “has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:” (1) South Carolina “is the home state of the child”; (2) no other state qualifies as a home state or any other state qualifying “has declined to exercise jurisdiction” since South Carolina “is the more appropriate forum,” and “the child and at least one parent . . . have a significant connection” with South Carolina (not just “physical presence”) and “substantial evidence is available in [South Carolina] concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships”; (3) all courts with home state or significant connection jurisdiction “have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that” South Carolina “is the more appropriate forum”; or (4) “no court of any other state would have” home state, significant connection, or more appropriate forum jurisdiction. S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-330(A) (2010) (emphasis added to clarify jurisdiction terminology).
However, the South Carolina family court could always decline to exercise jurisdiction if it determines that South Carolina “is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.” Id. § 63-15-342(A) (emphasis added). This issue can be raised upon a motion by either party or the court, or even at the “request of another court.” Id. In determining whether South Carolina is an inconvenient forum, the must review the information submitted by the parties and consider “whether it is appropriate for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction” based on “all relevant factors, including” but not limited to:
1) “whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child;”
2) “the length of time the child has resided outside” South Carolina;
3) “the distance between the” South Carolina court “and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction;”
4) “the relative financial circumstances of the parties;”
5) “any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;”
6) “the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the child;”
7) “the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and”
8) “the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation.”
Id. § 63-15-342(B). If the South Carolina court “determines that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another state is a more convenient forum, it shall stay the proceedings” provided that another proceeding is “promptly commenced in the designated state.” Id. § 63-15-342(C); see also id. § 63-15-344(B) (regarding “unjustifiable conduct”). However, the South Carolina court can still “impose any other condition the court considers just and proper.” S.C. Code Ann. § 63-14-342(C) (2010) (emphasis added). Under the UCCJEA, where a state’s jurisdiction is invoked by a person who “has engaged in unjustifiable conduct,” jurisdiction should be declined unless (1) the parents or acting-parents “acquiesced” to the jurisdiction; (2) any other states having jurisdiction decline jurisdiction in favor of the “more appropriate forum”; or (3) no other states have jurisdiction. Id. § 63-15-344(A) (emphasis added). This can add up for the party engaging in the unjustifiable conduct: That party is responsible for “necessary and reasonable expenses including costs, communication expenses, attorney’s fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and childcare during the course of the proceedings, unless” he or she can “establish[] that the assessment would be clearly inappropriate.” Id. § 63-15-344(C).
The PKPA and UCCJEA are meant to “avoid conflicting custody decrees between states” and “relitigation of custody decisions.” Clay, 369 S.C. at 658, 633 S.E.2d at 179. One of the ways of doing this is by limiting jurisdiction to the specific instances just laid out and encouraging enforcement rather than modification of existing custody orders. However, attempts to avoid conflict include limiting jurisdiction to a single state at a time: State courts with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction have “long-standing deference” to determine disputes. Russell v. Cox, 383 S.C. 215, 678 S.E.2d 460 (Ct. App. 2009). Additionally, a state cannot “exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody or visitation determination commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a court of another [s]tate where” the court “exercis[es] jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this section to make a custody or visitation determination.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g) (2006). Hence, much is determined by that race to the courthouse and who receives an initial order earlier.
So what happens when multiple state courts get involved in one dispute? A party can request that jurisdictional issues take priority: If a jurisdictional question “is raised in a child custody proceeding, the question, upon the request of a party, must be given priority on the calendar and handled expeditiously.” S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-312 (2010) (emphasis added). In our hypothetical, let’s assume that both Parent 1 and Parent 2 file in their respective states, but Parent 1 files first in South Carolina. If either state knows about the other’s proceeding, the courts should communicate to determine who should exercise jurisdiction. Under the UCCJEA, a South Carolina family court can “communicate with a court in another state” about the proceeding, and “may allow the parties to participate in the communication,” but “a record must be” kept of these communications. Id. § 63-15-318(A),(B),(D). “If the parties are not able to participate in the communication, they must be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made.” Id. § 63-15-318(B) (emphasis added). However, court communication about “schedules, calendars, court records, and similar matters may occur without informing the parties” and no records of these communications are required. Id. § 63-15-318(C).
Now all of this—proceedings in different states, communication between courts, etc.—can add up in expense for a concerned parent. Luckily, “the prevailing party” can be awarded “necessary and reasonable expenses incurred by or on behalf of the party, including costs, communication expenses, attorney’s fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and childcare during the course of the proceedings, unless . . . clearly inappropriate.” Id. § 63-15-372(A). If you need to register an out-of-state custody order or modify your custody arrangements, you should consult with a lawyer about your existing divorce order or modification orders because some aspects of the UCCJEA and the PKPA were not discussed here. Efforts to change your existing custody order could be affected by more than just the Acts discussed above—it could require an attempt at mediation prior to initiating any court action. Another example: If you want child support modified from that order, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act must also be taken into account. S.C. Code Ann. § 63-17-2900, et. seq. (2010). So although South Carolina could decline to exercise jurisdiction over your custody determination, your attempt to modify your child support could still stand a chance in South Carolina, if the custody determination were deemed “incidental to an action for divorce or another proceeding.” Id. § 63-15-342(D).
[1] A “custody determination” is “a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the custody of a child, and includes permanent and temporary orders, and initial orders and modifications.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(3) (2006) (emphasis added). A “visitation determination” is “a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the visitation of a child and includes permanent and temporary orders and initial orders and modifications.” Id. § 1738A(b)(9). In comparison, the UCCJEA defines a “child custody determination” as “a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child,” “includ[ing] a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order.” S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-302(3) (2010) (emphasis added). Under the PKPA, a modification is a “custody or visitation determination which modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior custody or visitation concerning the same child, whether made by the same court or not.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(5) (2006). The UCCJEA defines “modification” similarly: “a child custody determination that changes, replaces, supersedes, or is otherwise made after a previous determination concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that made the previous determination.” S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-302(11) (2010) (emphasis added).
[2] The “home [s]tate” is “the [s]tate in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months”; however, “periods of temporary absence of any such persons are counted as part of the six-month or other period.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4) (2006) (emphasis added). The state must qualify as a home state “on the date” the proceeding commenced or “within six months before” where “a contestant continues to live in such [s]tate” and “the child is absent from” the state due to “removal or retention by a contestant or for other reasons.” Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)(i),(ii). The UCCJEA definition of home state is effectively the same. S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-302(7) (2010).
[3] Assumption of jurisdiction “is in the best interest of the child” where “the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with [the] [s]tate other than mere physical presence” and “substantial evidence concerning the child’s present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships” is available in the state. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B)(i),(ii) (2006). This is what I refer to as “significant connection jurisdiction” and is described in the UCCJEA as well. S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-330(A) (2010).
[4] An emergency necessitates protection of the child where “the child, a sibling, or parent of the child has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(C)(ii) (2006).
[5] A state can “decline[] to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that” another state “is the more appropriate forum to determine custody or visitation of the child.” Id. §1738A(c)(2)(D)(i).
[6] Contestants, or persons “claim[ing] a right to custody or visitation of a child,” can include parents or grandparents. Id. § 1738A(b)(2).