Service of Process for South Carolina Family Court

South Carolina Family Court requires Service of Process. This is a legal term which means you have to give people notice, usually a certain amount of time in advance, of what is happening in court pertaining to them and give them an opportunity to be heard regarding what is going on. There are five ways a person can be served under the South Carolina Rules: Certified Mail, Process Server, Service by the Sheriff’s Office, Publication, or Acceptance of Service.

 

 

WAYS A PERSON CAN BE SERVED.

United States Postal Service:You can serve a person through United Stated Postal Service Certified Mail Restricted Delivery, Return Receipt Requested. This can be very costly, around $12.00 right now for a few ounces of mail. This is permitted according to Rule 4(d)(8).

 

Process Server:You can serve a person through a Process Server, my preferred server is Clay Stacey of Carolina Civil Process Service. Your attorney may choose to you another process server. If you are an attorney and do not have a process server you may wish to use Mr. Stacey or find a process server listed the National Association Professional Process Servers (NAPPS).  It is a good idea to give your process server a short informational sheet regarding the person to be served and your client’s information to help them serve the person faster. A private process server can cost anywhere from $65-$250 per person being served depending on a number of factors.

 

Sheriff’s Office: Service can also be done through the Sheriff’s Office where each Defendant is located. This will cost less than a process server however, in the event you are indigent you may be able to get the fees waived by the Sheriff. Generally the Sheriff will charge a flat fee for the first two attempts and then charge an additional amount for each additional attempt at service. Each Sheriff’s office will have their own office to contact regarding service and you can usually call and ask to speak to the officer or department who handles service issues in the appropriate county to find out exactly how they handle these types of requests. NOTE: YOU MUST SPECIFY TO THE SHERIFF THAT YOU WANT PERSONAL SERVICE TO MAKE SURE THEY DO NOT LEAVE THE PAPERS WITH SOMEONE AT THE RESIDENCE.

 

Publication: If you cannot find the person who is to be served and there has been a diligent search, the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure allow for a person to be served by Publication. This is very complicated and requires a Petition to the Court. “Service By Publication Or Out Of State,” Service rules start at S.C. Code Ann. § 15-9-710.

 

Acceptance of Service: A person can always accept service of any court documents by acknowledging in writing and signing a properly executed acceptance of service form. This is permitted under rule 4(j).

 

 

SERVICE OF THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT:

MANNER: The South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 4 governs the Rules of Service for the Summons and Complaint for a Family Law case in South Carolina. A summons and complaint must be personally served on the person who is being sued according to Rule 4(d). This means that the person being sued must be served with the papers themselves. The papers cannot be left at their residence, cannot be served upon an anyone else at the residence, and cannot be signed for by any other person at that address. You can use any of the methods mentioned above, to personally serve someone- however, I caution using publication.

 

TIMING: There are no specific time requirement for when the Summons and Complaint to be served.

 

 

TEMPORARY HEARING NOTICE:

MANNER: If served with the Summons and Complaint it must be personally served, however, if it is independent of the Summons and Complaint and the Summons and Complaint have already been served, this notice can be sent by any of the methods of service. Again, caution on using publication.

 

TIMING: The general rule is that a written motion for temporary relief and notice of the hearing needs to be served no less than 5 days before the hearing UNLESS a different time is specified in the order setting the hearing date. There are rare occasions where the court may deem a case an emergency situation, an order may be made on ex parte application. This means no notice would need to be given prior to the hearing date. THIS IS VERY RARE.

 

RULE TO SHOW CAUSE:

MANNER: A rule to show cause must be personally served upon a person by the Sheriff unless it is specifically requested in the pleadings to be served otherwise. Service must include verified petition or supporting affidavit.

 

TIMING: The general rule is that a written motion for a Rule to Show Cause needs to be served no less than 10 days before the hearing UNLESS a different time is specified in the order setting the hearing date.

 

 

FINAL HEARING NOTICE:

MANNER:  It is generally accepted that any of the above mentioned forms of service would also accepted. You should make a personal service for the final hearing notice to ensure you do not have any issues at your final hearing. If you use the US Postal Service you should send the document Certified Mail, Restricted Delivery, Return Receipt Requested, even though this is not specifically required by the rules. NOTE:  Even if your spouse does not sign for service, sending the document is sufficient for most courts. You generally need to show the notice was mailed. You generally do not have to show actual receipt of the notice.

 

TIMING: You must provide notice at least 10 days before the final hearing.

 

 

You should contact an attorney if you have any other questions about the South Carolina Rules of Service of Process. We can be contacted at 843.261.7025.

An Ancient Remedy: Remedial Writs

Typically, when an individual asks a court for an order restraining someone from performing a particular act or requiring its performance, they ask the court for an injunction.  An injunction is an equitable remedy and may be temporary or permanent.  In South Carolina, an ancient remedy may also be available:  remedial writs, like a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition.  Similar to an injunction, a writ can be temporary or permanent, but until a final judgment, it is temporary.

A writ of prohibition is an “ancient prerogative writ,” arising from common law.  A court can issue this writ “to restrain a judicial act” of a lower court.  Berry v. Lindsay, 256 S.C. 282, 288, 182 S.E.2d 78 (1971) (per curiam) (quoting Ex Parte Jones, 160 S.C. 63, 158 S.E. 134, 137 (1931)).  It is a remedy that is “used with forbearance and caution, and only in cases of necessity.”  Id.  It can only be used “to prevent an encroachment, excess, usurpation, or improper assumption of jurisdiction on the part of an inferior court or tribunal, or to prevent some great outrage upon the settled principles of law and procedure.”  Id.  It cannot be used “to correct errors and irregularities in procedure,” “to prevent an erroneous decision or an enforcement of an erroneous judgment, or even in cases of encroachment, usurpation, and abuse of judicial power or the improper assumption of jurisdiction” if there is available “an adequate and applicable remedy.”  Id. at 288, 292-93 (finding “abuse of discretion” does not qualify because it “merely means an error of law” and does not “reflect[] on the lower Court or tribunal”).  Essentially, if what you are seeking the writ for is appealable or otherwise reviewable, then you have an adequate and applicable remedy in seeking such review.  Id. at 288.

First, a writ of prohibition requires a judicial act or function, or one that is at least quasi-judicial.  Id. at 288-90.  Second, it requires an “alleged ground” that supports issuing such a writ.  Id. at 292.  Finally, the person seeking a writ of prohibition, or petitioner, must not have “adequate relief” available.  Id. at 293.  Where a review of the judicial act is possible, a petitioner should seek review and exhaust available remedies before “seek[ing] redress in the courts.”  Id.  However, if the petitioner “challenge[s] the authority of jurisdiction of the agency or officer,” seeking such a review may not be necessary.  Id.  Additionally, a petitioner may also allege that the available remedies “do not provide . . . adequate relief.”   Id.

In contrast, a writ of mandamus is a “coercive writ” issued “to compel a public official to perform a mandatory legal duty.”  City of Rock Hill v. Thompson, 349 S.C. 197, 200, 563 S.E.2d 101 (2002).  The South Carolina Supreme Court can issue a writ of mandamus if specific elements are shown:  (1) the public official has a positive duty “to perform the act”; (2) the act is “ministerial [in] nature”; (3) the moving party has a “specific legal right for which discharge of the duty is necessary”; and (4) there is no “other legal remedy.”  Edwards v. State, 383 S.C. 82, 95-96, 678 S.E.2d 412 (2009); see also Thompson, 349 S.C. at 200-01 (requiring public official to be properly served).  A writ of mandamus could be used to “direct a judge to rule on a pending motion” if the judge “refused to issue a ruling.”  Thompson, 349 S.C. at 200, n.2 (noting that one month delay in reconvening hearing after parties “agreed to continuance” was insufficient to show refusal).  However, it cannot be used to direct a “[j]udge to rule a particular way” unless the judge’s “discretion could only be exercised in one way.”  Id. at 200-01.  The motion could be denied because “[i]ssuance of a particular decision by a judge is typically a matter of discretion.”  Id.

In South Carolina, you can ask the court for a remedial writ by submitting a motion “supported by affidavit or verified complaint” clearly stating the facts supporting issuance.  Rule 65(f)(1), SCRCP.  However, remedial writs cannot be issued without notice “to the adverse party,” giving them an opportunity to be heard on the matter.  Id.  Once notice is given, “the court shall proceed to hear and determine such motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice require.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The court can also hear “claim[s] for any other relief,” including damages.  Rule 65(f)(2), SCRCP.  And if you have or expect damages, you should go ahead and ask because if you don’t, you may lose out on the claim.  Plum Creek Dev. v. City of Conway, 334 S.C. 30, 37, 512 S.E.2d 106 (1999) (“The term ‘may’ does not provide a plaintiff with the option of seeking damages at the same time it seeks mandamus or in a subsequent action.”).  If you prevail on your motion for a remedial writ, you are “entitled to recover costs . . . , including attorneys fees where proper.”  Rule 65(f)(2), SCRCP.

You should consult an attorney before submitting a motion for a remedial writ.  If you believe a remedial writ can help you, please discuss your case and the details of your particular situation with an attorney.  An attorney can assure that you comply with all legal formalities, like notice, to ensure you make the most of your request and hopefully get the writ you desire.

New Revised Proposed Parenting Plan Form Released

I previously posted about parenting plan forms being released.  However, on Tuesday, August 28, 2012, another Administrative Order from the South Carolina Supreme Court was released.  It approves a newly revised Proposed Parenting Plan Form to be used in South Carolina Family Courts.  The previous Proposed Parenting Plan Form, approved on August 17, 2012, was “revised to include a Joint Custody option in the Custody section of the form.”  The new Revised Proposed Parenting Plan Form can be found in the directory of court forms.

Never heard of a parenting plan being required in South Carolina?  Read my previous blog about our new child custody law.  Be sure to consult with an attorney about your case and proposed parenting plan.

Parenting Plan Forms Are Here

***The parenting plan form released on August 17, 2012, has been revised by Administrative Order of the South Carolina Supreme Court on August 28, 2012.  The Revised Proposed Parenting Plan Form should be used instead.  Although the form has been revised, the information contained in this blog remains unaffected.  You can read about the slight change to the form in my new blog.***

On Friday, August 17, 2012, parenting plan forms were released by Administrative Order of the South Carolina Supreme Court.  If you have not heard about South Carolina’s most recent child custody law requiring submission of parenting plans, check out my previous blog.  Make sure to consult with an attorney about the specifics of your case and parenting plan.

At first glance, the form might remind you of a Financial Declaration, but it covers custody arrangements (including how information will be shared between parents and how major decisions will be made).  There is a section for parenting schedules allowing schedule options for “regular/school year,” summer, and “holidays & birthdays”; restrictions on contact and exposure (attorneys read mutual restraining orders section); and contact considerations addressing methods, frequency, and timing.  Of course, there is a section entitled “other considerations for the court” as a catch-all for any other issues the form does not cover.  Finally, the form allows for appointment of a lay or attorney guardian ad litem, allowing a parent request a particular person be appointed to serve.  Conveniently, the signature section anticipates submission of joint parenting plans, designating places for both parents signatures.

An Introduction to the PKPA and the UCCJEA

Recently, I had a case that is becoming typical in our modern age, when the right to travel (and change residence) is protected by the Constitution of the United States, and South Carolina has eliminated the presumption against relocation.  Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (recognizing “at least three different components” to the right to travel granted by the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Latimer v. Farmer, 360 S.C. 375, 602 S.E.2d 32 (2004) (eliminating the former presumption against relocation and outlining four factors to use for relocation cases).  Here is a hypothetical scenario to give you an idea:  Parents with a child divorce in one state and the court orders joint custody.  Both parents move individually from that state to two different states, one being South Carolina.  Joint custody (as ordered) is no longer a viable option, but the parents orally agree to different arrangements.  Inevitably, there is a dispute over the arrangements, and so begins the race to the parent’s respective courthouses.  Much may be influenced by who wins this race and who has majority custody.

Both state and federal law are invoked because multiple states may be involved in this dispute.  For example, in our relatively simplistic hypothetical, at least three states are involved in the custody dispute:  1) the original state, which already has an order in place affecting custody; 2) Parent 1’s state; and (3) Parent 2’s state.  South Carolina, like many other states, has adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to “govern subject matter jurisdiction in interstate child custody disputes.”  H v. G, Op. No. 4955 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Mar. 16, 2012) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 11 at 27).  Federally, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) was also enacted for this purpose.  Id.  Subject matter jurisdiction generally refers to a court’s authority to hear a case and make a determination.  Both these laws attempt to determine which state’s family court has jurisdiction to make or modify a custody determination, but where they conflict, the PKPA governs.  Clay v. Burckle, 369 S.C. 651, 656, 633 S.E.2d 173, 176 (Ct. App. 2006).

The PKPA directs states to enforce, rather than modify, “any custody determination or visitation determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another [s]tate.”[1]  28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (2006).  Determinations are consistent with the PKPA “only if [the] court has jurisdiction under” its own state laws and an additional “condition[] is met.”  Id. § 1738A(c)(1),(2) (emphasis added).  “[A] state law inquiry” is incorporated into the PKPA “necessarily result[ing] in the application of the issuing state’s version of the . . . UCCJEA.”  H v. G, Op. No. 4955 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Mar. 16, 2012) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 11 at 27).  The following constitute additional conditions:  (1) the state qualifies as a “home [s]tate of the child”;[2] (2) “it appears that no other [s]tate would” qualify as a home state and assumption of jurisdiction “is in the best interest of the child”;[3] (3) “an emergency”[4] necessitates protection of the child or “the child has been abandoned” and “the child is physically present in [the] [s]tate”; (4) “it appears that no other [s]tate would have jurisdiction under” any other additional condition “or another [s]tate has declined to exercise jurisdiction”[5] and assumption of jurisdiction “is in the best interest of the child”; or (5) “continuing jurisdiction” exists.  28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)-(E)  (2006) (emphasis added).  Child custody determinations made by a South Carolina court having jurisdiction under the UCCJEA are binding on “all persons who have been served” according to South Carolina law “or notified” according to the UCCJEA, “or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard.”  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-310 (2010).  “As to those persons, the determination is conclusive as to all decided issues of law and fact except to the extent the determination is modified.”  Id.  However, before any “determination is made, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants, any parent whose parental rights have not previously terminated and any person who has physical custody of a child.”[6]  28 U.S.C. § 1738A(e) (2006).

A state court that makes a determination consistent with the PKPA has continuing jurisdiction “as long as” that state “remains the residence of the child or . . . any contestant” and state law continues to grant jurisdiction.  Id. § 1738A(d).  In our hypothetical, the original state had continuing jurisdiction until both parents moved out of that state with the child.  Additionally, any new state the parents move to would attempt to enforce the original state’s order, or custody determination, before considering modification of the determination.  In practice, this is done by registering the out-of-state custody order in the parents’ new state(s) for enforcement.  For a moment, assume that both parents, instead of moving to separate states, individually moved to the same state (as many divorced couples do for the sake of their children).  The registration process for the parents’ original custody order would be rather simple—the parents would register the order with a court in the new state—involving multiple counties, but only one state.  Contrast this with our original hypothetical:  Both new states can register the determination for enforcement.  However, with joint custody being unworkable in this scenario, enforcement alone is not enough.  In our hypothetical, the parents would want the original state’s custody order modified.

Under the PKPA, state courts cannot modify another state’s custody or visitation determination unless “it has jurisdiction to make” the determination, and “the other [s]tate” with continuing jurisdiction “no longer has jurisdiction” or declined jurisdiction.  Id. § 1738A(f)(1),(2) (custody determination); see also § 1738A(h) (visitation determination).  Under the UCCJEA, South Carolina can modify an out-of-state determination when it “has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination and” either: (1) the original state “determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction” or that South Carolina “would be a more convenient forum”; or (2) the original state or, more likely, the South Carolina court “determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any other person acting as a parent” no longer “reside” in the original state.  H v. G, Op. No. 4955 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Mar. 16, 2012) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 11 at 27).  A South Carolina court “has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:”  (1) South Carolina “is the home state of the child”; (2) no other state qualifies as a home state or any other state qualifying “has declined to exercise jurisdiction” since South Carolina “is the more appropriate forum,” and “the child and at least one parent . . . have a significant connection” with South Carolina (not just “physical presence”) and “substantial evidence is available in [South Carolina] concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships”; (3) all courts with home state or significant connection jurisdiction “have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that” South Carolina “is the more appropriate forum”; or (4) “no court of any other state would have” home state, significant connection, or more appropriate forum jurisdiction.  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-330(A) (2010) (emphasis added to clarify jurisdiction terminology).

However, the South Carolina family court could always decline to exercise jurisdiction if it determines that South Carolina “is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.”  Id. § 63-15-342(A) (emphasis added).  This issue can be raised upon a motion by either party or the court, or even at the “request of another court.”  Id.  In determining whether South Carolina is an inconvenient forum, the must review the information submitted by the parties and consider “whether it is appropriate for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction” based on “all relevant factors, including” but not limited to:

1)      “whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child;”
2)      “the length of time the child has resided outside” South Carolina;
3)      “the distance between the” South Carolina court “and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction;”
4)      “the relative financial circumstances of the parties;”
5)      “any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;”
6)      “the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the child;”
7)      “the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and”
8)      “the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation.”

Id. § 63-15-342(B).  If the South Carolina court “determines that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another state is a more convenient forum, it shall stay the proceedings” provided that another proceeding is “promptly commenced in the designated state.”  Id. § 63-15-342(C); see also id. § 63-15-344(B) (regarding “unjustifiable conduct”).  However, the South Carolina court can still “impose any other condition the court considers just and proper.”  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-14-342(C) (2010) (emphasis added).  Under the UCCJEA, where a state’s jurisdiction is invoked by a person who “has engaged in unjustifiable conduct,” jurisdiction should be declined unless (1) the parents or acting-parents “acquiesced” to the jurisdiction; (2) any other states having jurisdiction decline jurisdiction in favor of the “more appropriate forum”; or (3) no other states have jurisdiction.  Id. § 63-15-344(A) (emphasis added).  This can add up for the party engaging in the unjustifiable conduct:  That party is responsible for “necessary and reasonable expenses including costs, communication expenses, attorney’s fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and childcare during the course of the proceedings, unless” he or she can “establish[] that the assessment would be clearly inappropriate.”  Id. § 63-15-344(C).

The PKPA and UCCJEA are meant to “avoid conflicting custody decrees between states” and “relitigation of custody decisions.”  Clay, 369 S.C. at 658, 633 S.E.2d at 179.  One of the ways of doing this is by limiting jurisdiction to the specific instances just laid out and encouraging enforcement rather than modification of existing custody orders.  However, attempts to avoid conflict include limiting jurisdiction to a single state at a time:  State courts with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction have “long-standing deference” to determine disputes.  Russell v. Cox, 383 S.C. 215, 678 S.E.2d 460 (Ct. App. 2009).  Additionally, a state cannot “exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody or visitation determination commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a court of another [s]tate where” the court “exercis[es] jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this section to make a custody or visitation determination.”  28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g) (2006).  Hence, much is determined by that race to the courthouse and who receives an initial order earlier.

So what happens when multiple state courts get involved in one dispute?  A party can request that jurisdictional issues take priority:  If a jurisdictional question “is raised in a child custody proceeding, the question, upon the request of a party, must be given priority on the calendar and handled expeditiously.”  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-312 (2010) (emphasis added).  In our hypothetical, let’s assume that both Parent 1 and Parent 2 file in their respective states, but Parent 1 files first in South Carolina.  If either state knows about the other’s proceeding, the courts should communicate to determine who should exercise jurisdiction.  Under the UCCJEA, a South Carolina family court can “communicate with a court in another state” about the proceeding, and “may allow the parties to participate in the communication,” but “a record must be” kept of these communications.  Id. § 63-15-318(A),(B),(D).  “If the parties are not able to participate in the communication, they must be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made.”  Id. § 63-15-318(B) (emphasis added).  However, court communication about “schedules, calendars, court records, and similar matters may occur without informing the parties” and no records of these communications are required.  Id. § 63-15-318(C).

Now all of this—proceedings in different states, communication between courts, etc.—can add up in expense for a concerned parent.  Luckily, “the prevailing party” can be awarded “necessary and reasonable expenses incurred by or on behalf of the party, including costs, communication expenses, attorney’s fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and childcare during the course of the proceedings, unless . . . clearly inappropriate.”  Id. § 63-15-372(A).  If you need to register an out-of-state custody order or modify your custody arrangements, you should consult with a lawyer about your existing divorce order or modification orders because some aspects of the UCCJEA and the PKPA were not discussed here.  Efforts to change your existing custody order could be affected by more than just the Acts discussed above—it could require an attempt at mediation prior to initiating any court action.  Another example:  If you want child support modified from that order, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act must also be taken into account.  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-17-2900, et. seq. (2010).  So although South Carolina could decline to exercise jurisdiction over your custody determination, your attempt to modify your child support could still stand a chance in South Carolina, if the custody determination were deemed “incidental to an action for divorce or another proceeding.”  Id. § 63-15-342(D).


[1] A “custody determination” is “a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the custody of a child, and includes permanent and temporary orders, and initial orders and modifications.”  28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(3) (2006) (emphasis added).  A “visitation determination” is “a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the visitation of a child and includes permanent and temporary orders and initial orders and modifications.”  Id. § 1738A(b)(9).  In comparison, the UCCJEA defines a “child custody determination” as “a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child,” “includ[ing] a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order.”  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-302(3) (2010) (emphasis added).  Under the PKPA, a modification is a “custody or visitation determination which modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior custody or visitation concerning the same child, whether made by the same court or not.”  28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(5) (2006).  The UCCJEA defines “modification” similarly:  “a child custody determination that changes, replaces, supersedes, or is otherwise made after a previous determination concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that made the previous determination.”  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-302(11) (2010) (emphasis added).

[2] The “home [s]tate” is “the [s]tate in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months”; however, “periods of temporary absence of any such persons are counted as part of the six-month or other period.”  28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4) (2006) (emphasis added).  The state must qualify as a home state “on the date” the proceeding commenced or “within six months before” where “a contestant continues to live in such [s]tate” and “the child is absent from” the state due to “removal or retention by a contestant or for other reasons.”  Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)(i),(ii).  The UCCJEA definition of home state is effectively the same.  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-302(7) (2010).

[3] Assumption of jurisdiction “is in the best interest of the child” where “the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with [the] [s]tate other than mere physical presence” and “substantial evidence concerning the child’s present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships” is available in the state.  28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B)(i),(ii) (2006).  This is what I refer to as “significant connection jurisdiction” and is described in the UCCJEA as well.  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-330(A) (2010).

[4] An emergency necessitates protection of the child where “the child, a sibling, or parent of the child has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.”  28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(C)(ii) (2006).

[5] A state can “decline[] to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that” another state “is the more appropriate forum to determine custody or visitation of the child.”  Id. §1738A(c)(2)(D)(i).

[6] Contestants, or persons “claim[ing] a right to custody or visitation of a child,” can include parents or grandparents.  Id. § 1738A(b)(2).

South Carolina’s New Child Custody Law: Parenting Plans Start Next Month

South Carolina has a new child custody law:  H 4614[1] was officially signed into law by Governor Haley on June 18, 2012, after a few amendments and very little dissent.[2]  The new law does quite a few things, as evidenced by its official title alone constituting 299 words.  Among other things, H4614 defines joint and sole custody, creates a new requirement for submission of parenting plans, requires judicial consideration of joint custody in some cases, organizes scattered statutes and case law into a uniform listing of factors to be considered when the court determines custody, expands parental rights, and creates a Family Court Study Committee.  Most of H4614 went into effect when signed into law, but the section governing parenting plans will not be effective until next month.  So far, the law has drawn criticism for “overburden[ing] family court judges during initial hearings,” “increas[ing] the cost of a divorce proceeding,” discouraging advance settlements to custody disputes, clouding the definition of the best interest standard that is “clearly defined” in “court rulings on the issue,” and forcing people who are in conflict and may struggle with communication into a situation of sharing custody, which places any child in a tough position.[3]  And with that, let’s dive right in.

S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-210 defines joint and sole custody.  Sole custody, typically favored in South Carolina case law, is defined as a situation where a parent or other person “has temporary or permanent custody of a child and . . . the rights and responsibilities for major decisions concerning the child, including . . . education, medical and dental care, extracurricular activities, and religious training.”  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-210(2).  Joint custody “means both parents have equal rights and responsibilities for major decisions concerning the child,” but a judge could pick “one parent to have sole authority to make specific, identified decisions while both parents retain equal rights and responsibilities for all other decisions.”  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-210(1) (emphasis added).  Though custody determinations are left to the particular judge hearing the case, South Carolina judges have rarely awarded joint custody.  H4614 aims to increase joint custody[4] by requiring the family court to “consider all custody options, including, but not limited to, joint custody” in contested custody cases or if either parent requests joint custody.  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-230(C) (emphasis added).  In the court’s final order, a determination of custody must be accompanied by the court’s reasoning for the decision.  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-230(C).  Final custody determinations are still governed by “the best interest of the child” standard and the court can “award joint custody to both parents or sole custody to either parent,” but regardless of the custody determination, the family court can “allocate parenting time in the best interest of the child.”  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-230(A),(B),(D).

Where “an order for custody affect[s] the rights and responsibilities of the parents, the order can include (1) “approval of a parenting plan,” (2) an award of sole custody or joint custody, and (3) “other custody arrangements as the court may determine to be in the best interest of the child.”  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-240(A)(1)-(4).  If sole custody is awarded, the noncustodial parent will be allowed “appropriate parenting time.”  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-240(A)(2).  If joint custody is awarded, the order must include “residential arrangements with each parent in accordance with the needs of each child; and how consultations and communications between parents will take place, generally and specifically, with regard to major decisions concerning the child’s health, medical and dental care, education, extracurricular activities, and religious training.”  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-240(A)(3)(a),(b).  Obviously, much of this would be discussed in the parenting plan(s) submitted to the court.  Finally, the court’s “best interest of the child” factors (or those things the family court “must consider” when “issuing or modifying a custody order”) are easily organized into S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-240(B)(1)-(17):

(1) the temperament and developmental needs of the child;
(2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child;
(3) the preferences of each child;
(4) the wishes of the parents as to custody;
(5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child’s siblings, and any other person, including a grandparent, who may significantly affect the best interest of the child;
(6) the actions of each parent to encourage the continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent, as is appropriate, including compliance with court orders;
(7) the manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents’ dispute;
(8) any effort by one parent to disparage the other parent in front of the child;
(9) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child;
(10) the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school, and community environments;
(11) the stability of the child’s existing and proposed residences;
(12) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, must not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interest of the child;
(13) the child’s cultural and spiritual background;
(14) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected;
(15) whether one parent has perpetrated domestic violence or child abuse or the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser if any domestic violence has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or between the parent and the child;
(16) whether one parent has relocated more than one hundred miles from the child’s primary residence in the past year, unless the parent relocated for safety reasons; and
(17) other factors as the court considers necessary.

Previously, these factors were found in scattered statutes and case law.

The law further encourages parental involvement (and brings us into this century) by expanding the parental rights given in S.C. Code Ann. § 63-5-30 to also include “telephonic and electronic communication” between a minor child and either parent, “except in cases of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.”  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-250(A),(B).  In cases of sole custody, the custodial parent has a duty to “facilitate opportunities for reasonable telephonic and electronic communication between the child and the noncustodial parent” as ordered by the court.  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-250(A).  For joint custody situations, both parents “should facilitate” these communications between the child and other parent in compliance with their court order.  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-250(B).  Additionally, unless prohibited by court order or State law, in any custody situation, each parent has equal rights when it comes to accessing a child’s educational and medical records, and participating in school and extracurricular activities “held in public locations.”  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-260.

One big change to be aware of is found in S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-220, which governs submissions of newly instated parenting plans.  A parenting plan “reflects parental preferences, the allocation of parenting time to be spent with each parent, and major decisions, including, but not limited to, the child’s education, medical and dental care, extracurricular activities and religious training.”  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-220(A).  Beginning August 17, 2012, parenting plans must be submitted by each parent (or the parents/parties can choose to “submit a joint parenting plan”) “[a]t all temporary hearings where custody is contested.”  “[U]pdated parenting plan[s]” may be submitted “[a]t the final hearing.”  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-220(B).  The court will consider these plans before issuing a temporary or final custody order, but if a parent/party fails to submit a parenting plan, the court is not precluded from issuing an order.  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-220(A).  Theoretically, parenting plans should encourage both parents to realistically think about the practicalities of their proposed custody arrangement(s) and plan accordingly.  Most lawyers understand that regardless, these parenting plans will, in all likelihood, slightly increase the cost of divorce proceedings when children are involved.  Here’s hoping we can convey that this extra cost is for the sake of the children.

Finally, H4614 created the “South Carolina Family Court Study Committee” to look into “the feasibility of tracking the outcome of contested temporary and final custody proceedings in the family court.”  Findings should be issued by January 31, 2013.  Additionally, keep on the lookout for further updates regarding parenting plans:  Rules and forms are still to come from the South Carolina Supreme Court.  S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-220(C).  Until then, don’t forget to consult with an attorney about how parenting plans and H4614 could affect your case!


[1] For now, the enacted bill can be found at http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess119_2011-2012/bills/4614.htm.

[2]Rick Brundrett, Senator Stalls Child Custody Bill, The Nerve (May 17, 2012, 5:55 AM), http://thenerve.org/news/2012/05/17/Custody-bill/ (reporting that “Sen. Phil Leventis, D-Sumter, placed his name on the legislation indicating that he ‘desires to be present’ if the bill is debated on the Senate floor—a powerful procedural move that effectively delays, if not kills, consideration of a proposal”); Rick Brundrett, General Assembly Approves Family Court Bills, The Nerve (June 7, 2012, 5:55 AM) , http://thenerve.org/news/2012/06/07/custody-bills/ (reporting that “Leventis, who didn’t publicly state a reason at the time for blocking the bill, later removed his objection”).

[3] Rick Brundrett, S.C. House Bill Proposes Major Child Custody Law Changes, The Nerve (Feb. 6, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://thenerve.org/news/2012/02/06/bill-custody/; Robert Kittle, SC Senators Consider Bill to Increase Joint Custody After Divorces, WSPA (Mar. 1, 2012, 6:36 PM), http://www2.wspa.com/news/2012/mar/01/4/sc-senators-consider-bill-increase-joint-custody-a-ar-3332038/.

[4] Kittle, supra note 3.

Spousal Email Hacking in South Carolina

In a previous post (Users of Cloud-Connected Cellphones Unintentionally Providing Proof of Adultery), I warned of the risks of obtaining electronically stored information in violation of state or federal law: criminal or civil liability.  As a follow up, I wanted to discuss this point referencing Jennings v. Jennings, 389 S.C. 190, 697 S.E.2d 671 (Ct. App. 2010), the first South Carolina precedent regarding spousal email hacking.

In Jennings, the couple split after Husband admitted being in love with someone else, who he emailed from his office.  Uniquely, it was not the Wife who accessed these emails, but her daughter-in-law, who knew of the situation from Wife and had previously worked for Husband.  From her own computer, the daughter-in-law logged into Husband’s Yahoo account by changing his password and after reading some of the emails, invited Wife over.  The emails were printed, copied, and distributed to certain individuals (Wife’s divorce attorney and a private investigator hired from an agency).  After this initial incident, the daughter-in-law accessed Husband’s email account five or six more times, conveying any relevant information.

The Court of Appeals opinion focuses on the Husband’s claim that a violation of the Stored Communications Act (SCA) has occurred.  Under the SCA, a person who “(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system” is in violation.  Id. at 196, 697 S.E.2d at 674 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2006)).  Electronic storage is defined as “(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.”  Id. at 198, 697 S.E.2d at 675 (citing 18 U.S.C. §2510(17) (2006)).  In Jennings, the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court:  Yahoo was held to be an electronic communication service (ECS), or a service providing users “the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.”  Id. at 199-200, 697 S.E.2d at 675-676 (citing 18 U.S.C. §1510(15) (2006)).  Additionally, the emails were held to be stored for backup protection purposes.  Id. at 202-03, 697 S.E.2d at 677-78.

All of this points to a SCA violation, but I am sure the Husband was nonetheless disappointed with his successful appeal.  Why?  Well, because summary judgment was maintained in favor of Wife, Wife’s attorney, and Wife’s private investigator.  The Court of Appeals upheld summary judgment because 1) the ruling that they were not potential violators was not “specifically challenged” by Husband, and (2) daughter-in-law was the only person violating SCA by accessing the information; Wife and others merely disclosed or used the information.  Id. at 207-08, 697 S.E.2d at 680.  So what is my point?  Small details matter!  Things like who accessed the information and where the information was stored are extremely important and should be discussed with your attorney.  For example, had the Husband stored emails on his hard drive, those emails would not be covered by SCA.  Id. at 200, 697 S.E.2d at 676.

This case is so ripe with information about technology and the law, I am unable to discuss all aspects of it at this time.  So, other topics—a technological and legal comparison of ECS and remote computing service (RCS), the distinction between intermediate and post-transmission storage, etc.—must be left for another day.

Users of Cloud-Connected Cellphones Unintentionally Providing Proof of Adultery

Imagine you come home from work one day and get on your family computer that you share with your spouse, and perhaps children.  You promised a friend or relative you would send photos from your last vacation and you are ready to cross it off your To Do list.  You open the folder containing your pictures only to discover recent photos your spouse took of themself kissing someone else.  Needless to say, you are stunned and shocked.  While this scenario may seem unlikely, it is one that I am encountering variations of with ever-increasing regularity in consultations (though typically with evidence which may not be so G-rated).  Some blogs have termed this “the ‘cheating spouse outed by iCloud’ scenario.”[1]

If you are like most people, technology may not be your strongest suit.  In light of this fact, I will explain the implications of cloud-connected cellphones as simply as possible, specifically through the lens of Apple products for clarity’s sake.  However, I must emphasize that although I will use the term iCloud, the technological implications of cloud-connected devices are by no means limited to Apple devices.  Android devices are cloud-connected and allow a user to sync photos, applications (apps), email, and other content.[2]  In fact, most cellphones now operate with a cloud-connected automatic-syncing mechanism for selected content.

New Apple devices, like the iPhone and iPad, come equipped for iCloud when purchased.[3]  When setting up a new device, the user is prompted to choose whether to use iCloud or not and this choice may be adjusted later in the Settings menu.[4]  According to Apple, “iCloud automatically and securely stores your content so it’s always available to your” devices or computers.[5]  While what content is stored on iCloud is ultimately determined by the user, content can include music, photos, documents, calendar appointments and reminders, email, contact information, and more.[6]  Some of this content may seem innocuous enough, but some can evidence a spouse’s adultery.

Among the many features of iCloud is Photo Stream—when a user takes a photo on one device, it automatically appears on the user’s other devices and computers.[7]  For some, this could include a shared family computer.  Until the iCloud Control Panel 1.1 update, photos deleted from Photo Stream were not  automatically deleted from the Photo Stream download folder.  Some cheating spouses have been caught in this way:  taking pictures with a paramour in varying levels of incrimination, which automatically appear on a shared computer at home, where the other spouse inadvertently discovers this evidence of adultery.

Another feature of iCloud enables a user to access documents, which are automatically updated, on multiple devices through the use of applications, or apps.[8]  For example, say you use an app, like Dropbox,[9] OneNote,[10] or Evernote[11], to edit and organize documents on multiple computers and devices:  Think back to the scenario with pictures and Photo Stream, the same thing could happen with your documents.  Although this may seem like it has no context in family law, documents can contain financial evidence or even proof of adultery (a cheating spouse might keep a list saved on the family computer, innocently titled “My List,” describing his or her extra-marital sexual encounters)[12] which may be relevant to a divorce or custody matter.  Additionally, these apps are not limited to storing text documents; almost any files, including images, can be stored as well.

In South Carolina, adultery is a fault ground for divorce, and a finding typically bars alimony.[13]  Proof must be “clear and positive,” establishing the adultery “by a clear preponderance of the evidence,” or evidence that “which convinces as to its truth.”  Adultery may be proven through circumstantial evidence establishing inclination and opportunity:  “[P]roof must be sufficiently definite to identify the time and place of the offense and the circumstances under which it was committed.”  However, “sexual intercourse is not required to establish adultery; sexual intimacy is enough.”  Photographs of an unclothed spouse, paramour (lover), or spouse and paramour together could indicate adultery.  Evidence supporting a romantic relationship establishing adultery can include “love letters, romantic cards, hand-holding, hugging, kissing, or any other romantic demonstrations or actions between” a spouse and the paramour.[14]  This could include photos documenting romantic encounters.

Before you start scouring your home computer for evidence of your spouse’s adultery, consult with an attorney.  Some methods of obtaining electronically stored information may violate federal or state law and could create criminal or civil liability.  If you have already inadvertently discovered what you believe is evidence of adultery, you should consult with an attorney to determine the best course of action according to the specific facts and circumstances of your case.

South Carolina Supreme Court Changes Position on College Expenses and the Non-Custodial Parent

On March 7, 2012, the South Carolina Supreme Court did something uncharacteristic of a court usually predicted to follow precedent:  In an opinion authored by Justice Kaye G. Hearn, the Court overruled Webb v. Sowell, 387 S.C. 328, 692 S.E.2d 543 (2010) (holding that an equal protection violation occurs when a court is enabled to order a parent to contribute to his or her child’s college expenses merely because that parent was subject to a support order when the child turned eighteen), and returned to the reasoning of Risinger v. Risinger, 273 S.C. 36,  253 S.E.2d 652 (1979) (granting family court judges the ability to require a parent to contribute financially to the educational needs of a child over the age of eighteen, including college expenses, upon presentation of certain evidence) and its progeny.

In McLeod v. Starnes, Op. No. 27100 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Mar. 7, 2012) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 9 at 39), the Court reexamined Webb and determined that strict scrutiny was mistakenly utilized, rather than the proper rational basis test, in finding there had been an equal protection violation.  Strict scrutiny generally leads to a presumption against the law or government action called into question, unlike the rational basis test, which presumes it should be upheld.  Under this rational basis test, the distinction made by the government action or law must merely have some “rational” relation to a “legitimate” government interest.  In McLeod, the Court recognized the State’s strong interests in the welfare of its youth and in ensuring those youth are educated to become more productive members of society.

Cognizant of the possibility that most non-divorced parents “support their children through college years,” the Court also noted that “even well-intentioned parents, when deprived of the custody of their children, sometimes react by refusing to support them as they would if the family unit had been preserved.”  While the Court did not grant an “absolute right to a college education,” it did recognize that the Risinger factors attempt to provide a child whose parents, excepting the divorce, “would otherwise have paid” college expenses with the benefit of a college education.  When these limited circumstances were reexamined under rational basis, no equal protection violation was found:

While it is certainly true that not all married couples send their children to college, that does not detract from the State’s interest in having college-educated citizens and attempting to alleviate the potential disadvantages placed upon children of divorced parents.  Although the decision to send a child to college may be a personal one, it is not one we wish to foreclose to a child simply because his parents are divorced.

The facts in McLeod showed exactly what Risinger attempted to prevent:  A non-custodial parent refusing to contribute to the college expenses of his or her child for “no defensible reason.”  The parent in this case had “more than adequate means” to provide financial support and the child “truly desire[d] to attend college,” causing the Court to posit that the parent’s reasoning for refusal to contribute was merely “the shield erected by Webb”:  “Had Father and Mother remained married, we believe Father undoubtedly would have contributed towards [child]’s education.”  The Court went on to reaffirm the “harsh and unfortunate reality” Risinger seeks to address:  “[S]ometimes the acrimony of marital litigation impacts a parent’s normal sense of obligation towards his or her children.”  The factors outlined in Risinger require “evidence that: (1) the characteristics of the child indicate that he or she will benefit from college; (2) the child demonstrates the ability to do well, or at least make satisfactory grades; (3) the child cannot otherwise go to school; and (4) the parent has the financial ability to help pay for such an education.”

It is of note that the non-custodial parent in McLeod was barred from utilizing an alternate argument regarding the appropriate classification for the equal protection challenge because it was not used before the family court and thus preserved for appeal.  In front of the family court, the parent argued for divorced parents versus non-divorced parents being the appropriate classification.  Subsequently, the parent argued for a classification consistent with Webb:  parents subject to a child support order when emancipation occurs as compared to parents not subject to such an order at that time.